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"It," [the obligation upon the minister to account regularly for the expenditure of the public-money] "is one of the disadvantages of our excellent constitution; for, our national debt began at the revolution, and we have, in the most regular manner possible, spent five hundred millions, while other powers, with all their irregularities in finance, have not spent one quarter of the sum. How far our present improvements may lead, it is difficult to guess; but, we venture to say, that, in less than six months, the nation will lament the effect of these inquiries." — Review of the Tenth Report, by the friends of Lord Melville and Mr. Pitt.

577]

578

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

LORD MELVILLE AND HIS SUPPORTERS.

—Upon the *origin* of the scandalous performance, whence my motto is taken, sufficient has already been said, and, as to that topic, I have only now to say, that, from information recently received, I have reason to suppose, that the person, whom, from the matter, as well as the manner of the work, I naturally suspected to be the principal conductor of it, has had nothing to do with it. —The object of the work obviously is to mislead the public, and thereby to produce a feeling that may tend to produce, or to sanction when produced, an *unjust* decision; an *object*, which every one, who considers the character of the august assembly, before whom Lord Melville is to be tried, will confidently rely upon seeing frustrated; but which is not therefore the less to be detested. The *means* made use of are, in part, a reassertion of falsehoods already, over and over again, detected and exposed; such, for instance, as, that the public has *lost nothing* by the malversations of Lord Melville and Trotter; that Lord Melville *never participated* with Trotter; that *no delay in payments* ever took place; that Mr. Pitt did not believe, though informed by Mr. Raikes, that *any thing improper was going on*; that the loan to Boyd and Benfield was *necessary to the support of the credit of the nation*; and the like. But, the principal means resorted to, the main ground of defence, the grand rampart drawn round Lord Melville and Mr. Pitt, is, *a justification of an unlawful use of the public money*, or, to express it in two words, of *peculation and corruption*; and, as in the instance given in my motto, the checks upon the public expenditure are accordingly represented as amongst "the disadvantages of our excellent constitution," while we are, at the same time, forewarned, that we shall have to "lament the effects of the inquiries" into the conduct of Lord Melville and Mr. Pitt. There is, in this, something so impudent; so audaciously profligate; so insulting to the people from

whose property and whose labour the taxes are drawn, that, were it not for one curious argument connected therewith, I should pass it over in silent disdain. This argument is drawn from experience; and, we are told by these "gentlemen" supporters of Lord Melville and Mr. Pitt, that "it was by inquiring into abuses, and by pursuing persons in power who had been obliged to give into them, that the French revolution began, and that, eventually, the most ancient monarchy in Europe was destroyed;" and then we are significantly asked, whether "similar causes are not likely to produce similar effects." So that here an entire new ground of defence is taken. The merits, or demerits, of Lord Melville and Mr. Pitt are thrown aside, as having little or nothing to do with the matter. The existence of the abuse is acknowledged; but, it is represented as a necessary evil; as something so closely interwoven with the monarchy, that there is no destroying or checking the former, without destroying, or, at least, materially endangering the latter.—First, one might oppose to this, another argument drawn from experience, and that, too, of cases much more analogous; to wit; those of the Lords *Verulam* and *Macclesfield*, two High Chancellors of England, convicted, at two different epochs of our history, of the crime of corruption, of a magnitude inferior to that of which Lord Melville is charged, the former expelled from the House of Peers, the latter fined and imprisoned; and yet, we have never heard, that the inquiries relative to their conduct, or that the subsequent proceedings thereon, had the effect now so feinely apprehended by the *loyal Society of Gentlemen*, who have undertaken to support Lord Melville. On the contrary, the punishment of those two noblemen (in other respects men of real and distinguished merit) did, it has been generally allowed, tend greatly to check corrupt practices in all the departments of the state; did tend to convince the people, that, in the administration of justice in England, there

was no respect of persons; and, thereby did tend to confirm, and to increase, their love of the constitution, and, of course, their love of the monarchy. Indeed, if we talk of seditious libels, what libel can be more seditious and more infamous than that which tells the people, that the monarchy stands upon the foundation of violated law; that to inquire into a misapplication of the public money is to endanger the existence of the monarchy; that monarchy is, in short, what PAINE so falsely termed it, "the MASTER 'FRAUD," and that it cannot be supported without the aid of peculation and corruption! What might be the situation of France, in this respect, I know not; but, it is not without great regret, that I have observed, in the only two French periodical publications in this country, a steady bias, not only in favour of Lord Melville and Mr. Pitt, but in favour of their conduct, as developed in the Tenth Report and in the subsequent reports and discussions. Nay, I have perceived in those publications, which must be intended to circulate upon the Continent and to operate against Buonaparté, a constant endeavour to gloss over acts of corruption, and to misrepresent the motives and character of those members of parliament, who have, upon this occasion, espoused the cause of the country, some of whom have been compared to the democratical orators, who began the attack upon the monarchy of France. Under whose influence these writers may immediately act, I shall not pretend to say; but, I think, the reader will lament, with me, that, as far as their publications go, the cause of the Bourbons should appear to be identified with that of public robbery; and that the most decided enemies of Buonaparté should be also the most decided enemies of those who have been labouring in the cause of the country against peculation and corruption. The fair inference from such facts no one will fail to draw; and, therefore, it is our duty to maintain, that such writers are not the friends of monarchy. It is, too, the duty of kings and princes to shake out the vermin, who have nestled in the folds of the royal robe, and to show that the cause of monarchy and of the people are one. I know not what was the situation of France in this respect; and I now reject the argument made use of by the supporters of Lord Melville: but, if it be true, that the French revolution began by inquiries into abuses in the expenditure of the public money; if it be true, that abuses, like those lately discovered in England, did exist in France, and to a similar extent; and, if it be true, that those abuses were ab-

solutely necessary to the existence of the ancient monarchy; if all this be true, which, however, I do not believe; but, if it be true, then, had I known it fourteen years ago, I should not, I hope, ever have let fall one expression of regret for the overthrow of that monarchy, though it had been as ancient as the foundations of the world. PAINE, indeed, had told me, that monarchy was the "master fraud," and, with additions and improvements, the democratical writers of America repeated his assertion. But I denied the fact, and upon that ground defended monarchy, never imagining, of course; never dreaming, that my defence of monarchy would be construed into a defence of peculation, and that the day would come, when my then defence of Kings, compared with my subsequent attacks upon peculators, would be urged against me as a proof of *inconsistency*! Never was I a defender of peculation or corruption; but, on the contrary, from the time, when, at eighteen years of age, I stood forward and procured justice for my brother-soldiers, whom the quarter-master of the regiment, by means of short weights and measures, cheated of their rice and peas and butter; from that day to the present, I have always, when occasion presented itself, shown my enmity to every species of public fraud or robbery, and have used my utmost endeavours to bring to shame and disgrace all those who were guilty of it. At the very time, when, in America, I was defending the cause of monarchy, I was assailing men guilty of corruption; and, one of my pamphlets then published is wholly taken up with an exposure of the conduct of the then principal Secretary of State, who, it was discovered, from an intercepted correspondence, had asked a bribe from the Ambassador of France. Am I told, that I then sang the praises of the very men, whom I am now censuring? I answer, that, if I ever did praise Mr. Dundas, and I do not recollect that I ever did, it was the prosecutor of Sir Thomas Rumbold and others; that I praised, and not the violator of the law, not the conniver at the practices of Trotter, not the Mr. Dundas, who, when asked what he had done with ten thousand pounds of the public money, declares that he never will tell, and who when questioned by legal authority as to any profits that he may have made from a misapplication of the public money, refuses to answer, upon the ground openly alleged, of fear of *criminating* himself. If I praised Mr. Pitt, it was Mr. Pitt the "heaven-born" minister, with regard to whose character I had participated in the adoption of those notions so prevalent

amongst the ignorant crowd about twenty years ago. It was Mr. Pitt the corner stone of the confederacy against republican France; Mr. Pitt who had openly and solemnly vowed never to make peace with France, till the political balance of Europe should be completely restored, and till safety and tranquillity could be obtained for England; it was this Mr. Pitt that I praised, and not the Mr. Pitt who advised, who defended, and who extolled the peace of Amiens. The Mr. Pitt that I praised, as a financier, was the Mr. Pitt, who, in the year 1799, declared that he would carry on the war, for any length of time, without the creation of new debt; and not the Mr. Pitt, who, in less than two years afterwards, justified the peace as necessary for the husbanding of our resources, having, in the interim, created new debt to the amount of about seventy millions sterling. If I praised Mr. Pitt, as an upright public man, as a real patriot, it was the Mr. Pitt, who began his career with professions of incorruptible purity, and who, in the warmth of his zeal, had proposed to reform the parliament itself, rather than not cut off the means of corruption; and not the Mr. Pitt who procured to be passed the bill relating to the Nabob of Arcot's debts (of which bill I had never yet heard); not the Mr. Pitt who, notwithstanding the information of Mr. Raikes, suffered the practices of Lord Melville and Trotter to go on unchecked; no, no; not the Mr. Pitt who lent forty thousand pounds of the public money, without interest, to two members of parliament, never making, or causing to be made, any record or minute of the transaction, and never communicating any knowledge of it even to the cabinet ministers. This was not the Mr. Pitt whom I praised, whose character I so zealously defended, and against whose accusers I made use of severity, for which it becomes me now to beg pardon of the American public. This was not the Mr. Pitt that I praised; not the Mr. Pitt whose power I endeavoured to support; and, I trust, that amongst his supporters, whoever may be his associates, I never shall be found. The English constitution that I extolled was that constitution, which, to use the words of Mr. Pitt himself, in his early days, carefully watches over the property of the people; that constitution which effectually prevents any misapplication of the public money, or severely punishes those who may be guilty of such misapplication; and which, above all things, provides, that the money raised upon the people, by the consent of their representatives, shall not, in any degree, or under any name, be given to those representatives by

the ministers of the crown, and especially in a *secret* manner. This constitution I hope yet to see preserved in its purity, and, were it not for that hope, neither hand nor pen would I move in its defence. But, it will be so preserved, or we are the most base of mankind. We ought to reject with horror; we ought to abominate, the doctrine, that we must wink at corruption, or that the monarchy cannot be preserved. It is a doctrine that leads certainly and directly to political perdition; for, I ask, is it in the nature of Englishmen, is it in the nature of any people in the world, to make sacrifices of property and of ease, and to venture their lives, for the sake of preserving that, by which, they are plainly told, they always will, and must, be robbed? Away, then, with this dangerous and most detestable doctrine! Let no one separate the interest of the King from that of his people; and let no one insinuate that peculation and corruption will ever find favour in a royal mind.

CONTINENTAL WAR.—At the close of the last article upon this subject, an apprehension was intimated, that it was not true, as stated in the ministerial prints, that the Elector of Bavaria had joined his forces to those of the allies; and, it now appears, that that apprehension was but too well founded. The statement of the Treasury print, the *SUN*, which is to the Pitt ministry exactly what the *Moniteur* is to the government of France, is worthy of particular notice. It should be read with attention; for, it is easy to perceive, that it is intended to pave the way for a more direct defence of the conduct of Austria in seizing upon the Electorate of Bavaria, and in the adoption of those subsequent measures of appropriation of treasure, &c. which, at present, do seem to stand in need of some explanation. "We stated some days ago, upon what we conceived to be *indisputable authority*, that the Elector of Bavaria had declared his intention of joining the allies with all his forces. The intelligence which has since been received from the Continent seemed so much at variance with our assertion, that some of our contemporaries have accused us of having made the statement without sufficient grounds. We have, however, received a letter from Munich, which fully explains the seeming contradiction, and completely justifies us for having laid the intelligence alluded to before our readers. The letter we have received from Munich (the *authenticity of which may be firmly relied upon*) states, that when the Emperor of Germany, in consequence of the repeated aggressions

" and usurpations of the French government, determined to form an armed mediation, the occupation of Bavaria was deemed absolutely necessary; his Imperial Majesty therefore proposed to the Elector, that if he would suffer his troops to enter Bavaria, he would consent to no peace in which the integrity of the Elector's dominions should not be guaranteed. In answer to this application the Elector of Bavaria replied, *we have reason to believe*, in a letter under his own hand, in which he expressed his satisfaction at the proposal which had been made, and adding, that he had instructed his minister to sign a treaty of alliance with the Emperor of Germany, and that he would join the allies with all his forces. After this positive declaration, it was with the utmost surprize that the Emperor learnt, in a few days, that the Elector had retired to Wurtzburg; that he had ordered his troops to follow him; and that he had entered into another treaty with Bonaparte, in direct contradiction to his most positive assurances. This most extraordinary and unaccountable conduct, to use no stronger terms, naturally provoked the indignation of Austria, and has led to those strong measures which she has since adopted with respect to the Electoral Dominions."

—First, it should be observed, that the authenticity of this letter, or pretended letter, from Munich, rests upon precisely the same grounds as did that of the intelligence relative to the Elector's having declared his intention of joining the allies with all his forces. It is much to be desired, that the Elector's conduct may, for the sake of Austria, prove to have been such as it is now represented; because, very dangerous indeed would be the example of the Emperor's having *wantonly* invaded and over-run one of the States of the Empire, suspending its internal government, and seizing upon its revenues. Measures so "strong" do, indeed, require a full justification; and it is to be hoped, that such a justification, through the means of official documents, is at hand. The French, as will be seen by their manifestoes, assert, that the Elector of Bavaria had no desire but that of preserving a strict and impartial neutrality; but, it would argue a great want of recollection to believe, that the French would have suffered such a neutrality any longer than it suited their own convenience, or, that, if not obviously advantageous to themselves, they would have suffered it at all. To enter Bavaria, therefore, might easily admit of a justification,

perhaps; but, to seize on its revenues can be justified upon no ground other than such as that, whereon war might be justified; and, to justify war, there must be a *previous declaration of war*, which, in this case, it is to be feared, there was not.—Indeed, it really does appear, from all that we have yet seen upon the subject, that the paragraphs, published in the Treasury papers, holding forth assurances of the Elector, having resolved to join the allies, were invented for the purpose of preparing the public for a justification of the invasion of his dominions and the seizure of his treasures. Accordingly, we now hear him charged with "unprincipled duplicity," by the very writers, who, the other day, were profusely liberal in praise of his character. Excite indignation against him; nay, only make it be believed, that his ruin will be conducive to our safety, and your business is done; all the proceedings against him will be approved of by the great mob of coffee-house politicians, however unjust those proceedings may be in themselves, and however dangerous wise men will perceive them to be in their probable and almost inevitable consequences.—With respect to the movements of the hostile armies very little can be said with certainty.—The French and the Austrians are approaching one another; and, if they meet, we may be assured, that the meeting will take place before the Russians can advance to the aid of their allies. Neither side appears to have been very well prepared; but, the French will certainly force the enemy to a battle, before he can receive such an accession of strength as the Russians would bring. If a battle should speedily take place; and, if the Austrians should be defeated, the continental war is over at a single blow; and we shall then have leisure to repent of those counsels, by which Austria has been *hurried* into hostilities, which, in such case, will bow her down to the earth; will deprive us even of the *hope* of continental aid; and which will have produced no diversion, worth speaking of, in favour of our shores, or even in favour of Lord Melville! Than such a battle, a negociation, ending in a peace between Russia and Austria on the one side, and France on the other, would be scarcely less mischievous to us; and, if we are admitted to the negotiations, who does not see, that our conquests in India and our rights upon the seas will become prominent subjects of discussion? If Austria be, no matter whether by the pen or the sword, *new* put out of the field, without having wrested from France any material part of her con-

quests, the situation of England will then be beyond all comparison more dangerous than it would have been, if the continent had remained at peace; because, as was before observed, our very hope of continental aid, our chance of such aid, will be destroyed, and with them the corresponding apprehensions of our enemy, who will then bring down his whole force, not to alarm, but, in good earnest, to attack us, and that, too, at a time when our regular forces will either be scattered abroad, or will have but just returned home half diminished in their numbers. Not a moment will he lose: his legions will come pouring down like wolves from mountains of snow: no reason will retard their progress: he will drive them through the mire and the storms of December with as much celerity as he would over the green-sod and athwart the breezes of May: the conquest, nothing short of the conquest, of England, will then be his sole, his avowed, and settled purpose, and to prevent the accomplishment of which, we must, as I trust in God we shall, beat him upon English ground. If events should lead to this point, we shall see who are the men who will stick by their country. We shall see whether our security lies in our funds or in our arms. Much have we lately heard of vain boasting, in the metropolis; much exultation at the approaching annihilation of our enemy. These boastings never lead to good; they are the sure signs of inherent timidity; and, should the tug of war at last come; should the enemy at last land upon our shores, these big talkers will be "blanched with fear;" I will bet, or to use their own slang, I will take five guineas to return a hundred, if there be one square inch of red cheek found within half a mile of Change Alley.—Precipitate, however, as have been the councils, which have produced the war upon the continent, let us hope, that the result may not be so disastrous as present appearances forebode. The subjects of the House of Austria are loyal, and its soldiers are brave. There appears to be a want of pecuniary resources; but, where there are skill and courage, failure will seldom arise from a deficiency in point of money. At any rate, the contest has begun; and, as to ourselves, whatever reason we have to be dissatisfied with the councils which have prematurely produced it; whatever dislike we may have to the persons, by whom it is, on our part, to be conducted, it is our duty honestly, and even cheerfully, to contribute towards all those means by which it is possible for us to assist in affording it a chance of success.

WEST-INDIA CONVOYS.—The many contradictory accounts that have, during the last four months, appeared, relative to the movements of the convoys and the fleets in the West Indies, made it desirable to obtain some regular and well-authenticated history thereof. Such an one I am now enabled to lay before my readers; and they will, when they have perused it, be able to judge of the zeal and vigilance of those, whose duty it was to attend to the distribution of our naval force.—The 12th of April last was appointed by official notice for the sailing of the *first* homeward-bound convoy. On the 19th of February the French squadron from Rochefort arrived at Martinique, and held the undisputed command of the seas, among the islands, until March 23d, when they departed altogether from the Leeward Islands for St. Domingo. On the 28th of March, certain intelligence was received, of the Rochefort squadron having actually passed St. Thomas's in their way to Leeward. On the 2d of April, Admiral Cochrane arrived at Barbadoes with a squadron in search of the French, and shortly after went in pursuit of them. From this time until the 15th of May, there was no enemy, or any other apparent impediment to the usual progress of the trade; an interval of several weeks. Yet the convoy appointed for the 12th of April was postponed by Admiral Cochrane's authority, and the 12th of May was fixed upon for the sailing of a *first*, and the middle of June for a *second* convoy. No ships of war attended according to appointment, on the 12th of May, at the respective islands to take away the ships; which, had they sailed, would most probably have proceeded, without any further delay or obstruction. But on the 15th of May, the combined fleets from Toulon and Cadiz arrived at Martinique, and once more threw our islands into consternation, and for a month nearly held the absolute dominion of the seas. In consequence of the arrival of the combined fleets, orders were sent to the respective islands to stop the ships; there being then, nearly 200 sail of valuable ships, ready to proceed, which had only hitherto waited the convoys in April and May. However, no orders were sent to stop the trade from St. Vincent, which, amounting to 30 sail of large heavy-laden vessels, was taken from that island on the 19th of May, under charge of a single schooner, and conducted down to Grenada to meet the rendezvous, and proceed homewards. These ships on their arrival there, so far from meeting with any ships of war to take them under protection, and proceed on their voyage, were on the

contrary left to themselves, and obliged to haul into the Carenage at St. George's for their security; where they were suffered to lay and rot for seven weeks after. During that time they buried one-fourth of their seamen, from the extreme unhealthiness of the place, noted always for its stagnant and putrid effluvia. Besides the expenditure of their stores, the vexation to individuals, and the heavy charges to the owners all this time, the Colony of St. Vincent was likewise deprived of the necessary strength and assistance, at such a crisis, of a large body of able defenders; which, at the time, it stood more in need of than any other island. Upon what grounds then, this very extraordinary exception as to the trade of this particular island, took place, remains to be explained. It certainly proved a sacrifice of many valuable lives, and a very great oppression to the proprietors, both planters and merchants. On the 4th of June, Lord Nelson arrived at Barbadoes, in search of the French and Spanish fleets, which, at the very terror of his name, hastily fled from Martinique the next morning, and escaped to the northward. How Lord Nelson was misled, so that he did not intercept them, (though a subject worthy indeed of a serious inquiry,) in no wise relates to this statement. On the 14th of June, the last accounts received of the enemy, viz. that they were flying to the northward, and Lord Nelson following, he being now between them and the islands, which they had left altogether. There was now once more an open sea, and no apparent hindrance to the sailing of our convoys, and accordingly, it was anxiously expected they would proceed about the middle of the month, the time appointed for the second convoy as before mentioned. But no regard was paid to them; although by this time the collective number of ships ready, and fully laden, was greater than was ever known at any one time in the West Indies; nor was it until the 6th of July that any movement took place; on which day, the Proselyte took away from Grenada, the St. Vincent, Grenada, and Tobago ships, in order to proceed with them to St. Christopher's, and there to rendezvous. In their way thither they fell in with the St. Lucia ships passing them on the opposite tack going to Grenada by orders, to rendezvous there. A curious instance of collecting the trade together! They all, however, joined, and not being able to fetch St. Christopher's, which is scarcely ever possible, even for single ships coming from Grenada, much less for a fleet of heavy merchantmen, they reached Peter's Island, one of the Tortola Keys, on the 11th,

and anchored under it. Under this Islet, which is a mere barren rock, without a drop of water, or an article of provision upon it, and without a single battery or fort for protection, were these ships, amounting to about 120 sail of our finest and most valuable merchantmen, detained for three weeks longer, and in an open roadstead, subject to every hazard from the enemy's frigates or privateers. So that having neither the means of recruiting their stock, or replenishing their water, they actually at last were obliged to enter upon their voyage with necessities barely sufficient for present use; for, the ships at Trinidad having been left behind, or forgotten, and the whole of the trade not collected until the 31st of July, many of the ships, viz. those from St. Vincent, had been actually ten weeks out from their port of lading, when the convoy, on that day, took its departure from Tortola for England! Let it be recorded likewise, as a circumstance, unparalleled and unprecedented, in our commerce with our colonies, that this was the first regular convoy, which sailed July the 31st, in the whole of this year; by which time, in every former period, at least two, if not three, used to have arrived at home with the wealth and produce of our plantations.—Upon reading this narrative, and perceiving the conclusion, to which it directly points, the Pitts and Melvilles will exclaim, did we not tell you what would be the consequence of your naval inquiries, your votes of censure, and your impeachments? We told you, in June last, that, “in less than six months, the nation would “repent of these inquiries; for that while “you thus engaged the attention of ministers, the French squadrons might go in “and out as they pleased.” This is insolence such as was never before witnessed. The argument amounts to this: we care nothing about the merits of the case: there may have been peculation enormous for aught we know: but, if you take up the time of the ministers by calling upon them to account for their management of your money, you must expect them to leave you exposed to the enemy, and have no right to blame them for it! There are no words, whereby to express a degree of indignation suitable to such an argument. Blows, and those dealt by the roughest hand and with the most degrading weapon, can alone convey an appropriate answer. Yet is this argument the natural offspring of that intolerably insolent opinion, according to which, Mr. Pitt and his creatures are the only persons, who have, or can have, a right to exercise the powers and enjoy the emoluments

of government, in England. This, as I have frequently observed, is become an opinion, a real current opinion, amongst the innumerable swarms of place-holders and place-hunters and other possessors during pleasure, or expectants, that crowd about the metropolis. Never does it appear to enter, for one moment, into their minds, that, if these Tenth-Report gentlemen have time to attend to nothing but their own defence, the powers of the state, the protection of the country and its colonies, ought to be placed, or rather, ought, long ago, to have been placed, in *other hands*. The course of their reasoning upon this subject has in it something so curious, that I cannot forbear giving another specimen of it. "If any particular measure, however just in itself," [alluding to the inquiry into the conduct of Lord Melville and Mr. Pitt] "tends to *lay us open to our enemy*, it should be suspended, not through fear of an enemy, but from regard to ourselves. We must take every means of defence, every means of safety, and not be considering dignity defined in this manner. What, says an Englishman, is any person to dictate to me, what I am to do in my family? Yes, certainly, in some cases. The thief makes you put locks on your doors, and if he attacks you, he compels you to rise in the middle of the night; but in this, though there is hardship, there is no disgrace. Were a man to compel another to sit upon a particular chair in a coffee-house, or to walk across a straw, though it might be dangerous to refuse, it would be a disgrace to submit; but danger of another sort does away disgrace, because you do it for your own sake, not in obedience to the will of another. You might as well say, that Buonaparté recruited and augmented the army, because he is the first cause of its augmentation, as to say that he suspends the course of inquiry into naval abuses, because we find OUR attention necessary for defence against Buonaparté. The whole nation see that the attention of government is, in a great measure, occupied on transactions at home; when it should be all employed on what is necessary for our defence and existence as a nation."—If this logic does not satisfy the West-India merchants and planters, and reconcile them to their inconveniences and losses, it is hard to say what will! The government (mark the word) has had its whole attention occupied on transactions at home; that is to say, in defending persons charged with public robbery. A very pretty

occupation for a government, especially when produced as a justification for neglecting the measures "necessary for our defence as a nation!" Observe, it is the government, nothing short of the English government, whose whole attention has, it is stated, thus been occupied.—Who, twenty years ago, when the Grocer's Company was feasting the "heaven-born" minister, would have expected to see the day, when the invasion and plunder of colonies and the capture or destruction of ships and merchandize would be ascribed to his attention having been wholly occupied at home? and what would the wise-acre grocers have said, had it been added, that the principal object of this his attention would be to obtain a bill of indemnity for himself, for having lent the public money, without interest, to members of parliament?—Agreeably to the reasoning of these partisans of Lord Melville and Mr. Pitt, it is not, then, the ministry, but the opposition, who are to blame for the disgraceful events in the West-Indies; for it is they, who, by their inquiries into the misapplication of the public money, have caused the attention of the accused persons to be occupied at home, and have thus (these persons being the ministers) "laid us open to our enemies!" Impudent, insulting to the public sense, as this is, it has, nevertheless, found its way through all the channels of ministerial influence, the creatures of which were heard to express their satisfaction, that parliament was, at last, prorogued; and their hopes, that now, the "attention of government" would be no longer turned aside from measures of national defence. At that time, too, the dread of invasion was great, and "what a shame it is," say they, "that, at such a time, parliament should waste its time in domestic squabbles;" always endeavouring to inculcate, by the way, the idea, that the contest was for power and place, and not for justice.—How would this doctrine suit, if applied to the people? When one of them has been guilty of what subjects him to a legal inquiry, does the magistrate, or the judge, or any one else, ever think of asking what inconvenience the inquiry will cause to his concerns? If a man detected in smuggling or poaching (hardly worthy to be called crimes, when compared to that of peculation or corruption) be brought to trial, do the prosecutors, or the judges, stop to inquire what injury his family, or his parish, will sustain from his loss of time, from his attention being thus diverted from the duties of his station? And, if he be in debt; if his being withdrawn from his business produces a failure

in his engagements, will that plea avail him aught against the consequences of a writ? Will it save him, for one moment, from jail? If your servant rob you; if he be guilty of a breach of trust; if he connive at others who rob you; if you even suspect him of any one of these offences, do you still keep him in your service? Do you continue to pay him his wages, though, from his attention and time being "wholly occupied" in his defence, he entirely neglects his work? And do you, in such case, allow of such a plea? What partiality, then; what abominable injustice, must inherit the mind of that man, who can attempt to justify the ministers, with regard to the events in the West-Indies, upon grounds such as those above alleged.—It must be fresh in the memory of every man, that we ended the last war with a boast, that the fleets of France were annihilated. Twenty speeches in parliament could be quoted as to this point, but we will confine ourselves to that of the profound and acute Sir Henry St. John Mildmay, when, on the 7th of May, 1802, he was seconding the motion of that other great statesman, Lord Belgrave, for a vote of thanks to the "heaven-born" minister. "We," said Sir Henry, "have wrested from the enemy many of her most valuable colonies, thwarted her in many of her most favourite objects, annihilated the whole of her marine, and possessed ourselves of the whole of her commerce, without any loss." Men of Winchester! Sage Mayor and Aldermen and Reverend Prebendaries, hear this, and recollect what has since come to pass! Ask the people of Tobago and Martinique what colonies of France we were able to keep; ask the Dutch, the Swiss, and the Italians, what object of hers we were able to thwart; and, ask the West-India merchants and planters; go ask the graves of the thousands of seamen that have perished in our locked up convoys, whether we have annihilated the whole of her marine!

Botley, Thursday,
17th Oct. 1805.

The 5th Volume of the PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES has been some time finished, being the 3d and last volume of the Debates of last Session. The Appendixes to these three volumes contain the whole of the papers, that were laid before Parliament, relative to the war with Spain; the Eleven Reports of the Commissioners of Naval Inquiry; the Reports of the Select Committees of the House of Commons on the Tenth and the Eleventh of October, also all the

annual accounts relating to the Finances and Commerce of Great Britain and of Ireland. The importance of the several papers, here mentioned, need not be pointed out; and, as the Editor believes, they are not to be found in any other work extant.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

AUSTRIA AND FRANCE.—*Proclamation issued by the Emperor of Austria, to his Hereditary States, dated Sept. 1805.*

We, Francis the Second, Emperor Elect of the Romans, Hereditary Emperor of Austria, &c. — Facts known to all the world prove, that since the conclusion of the Treaty of Luneville, we have had nothing so much at heart as the maintenance of the peace which we had procured for our faithful people by the said Treaty. The scrupulous accomplishment of all the obligations which that Treaty imposed upon us; the observance of a perfect neutrality in the naval war, and the most friendly moderation, when the Emperor of the French violated several of the principal stipulations of the Peace, and endangered by numerous abuses, the repose and equilibrium of Europe, gave us every right to hope with confidence, that our warm and sincere desire for peace would be fulfilled.—Yet the armaments ordered by the Emperor of the French close to the frontiers of the Tyrol and the Duchy of Venice, joined to direct menaces, required of our parental solicitude for our hereditary states, counter armaments, which, however, though destined to do away our fears for the safety of our states, could not be to France a subject of mistrust or of open complaint.—At the same time that we took these measures of precaution, to which we saw ourselves forced, we took with the courts of Petersburgh and Paris, when negotiations to be opened between those two courts had been frustrated, the proper measures nevertheless to attain the salutary object, and to produce the resumption of the negotiations for peace interrupted. The court of France did not acknowledge our intentions on this head, and refused our mediation. The Court of Russia, on the contrary, declared itself ready to open, in concert with us, and with equal moderation, pacific negotiations, and to employ an armed mediation for the re-establishment of the repose, security, and political balance of agitated Europe.—We, far removed from the desire of seeing a new war break out, but convinced of the imperious necessity of those energetic measures, which can alone insure real and lasting peace, partake perfectly the determination of the Emperor of



all the Russias on this subject, and hope, from its good execution, with well founded confidence, the desired effect. But also we expect, with no less confidence, that our dear and faithful subjects who have afforded us, for thirteen years of a reign accompanied with the most extraordinary events, so many deep proofs of unshaken attachment, will support us with all their might in this undertaking, formed with a view to their real good, and will hasten, in consequence, to aid us in restoring that happy state of things which was always our first object and the wish nearest to our heart.—We expect then of our faithful states and subjects, that they will not only continue to pay regularly the tax called the classes, which has been levied in 1805, and which has been prolonged in 1806, by a particular patent, dated this day, but that they will also furnish, with no less good-will to maintain our armies more easily, contributions in kind, consisting of corn and oats. (The proclamation then fixes the number of bushels for each province.) However willingly we should grant to our faithful states and subjects the usual indemnity for these supplies, we cannot this time satisfy this desire, because our finances, obliged to make head against so many other extraordinary expenses, are not in a condition also to supply the indemnity, and that there would thus remain to pay it no other resource than to raise the necessary sums by means of another contribution in money.

Note transmitted by the French Chargé d'Affaires to the Directorial Minister at the Diet of Ratisbon, dated Ratisbon, Sept. 25, 1805.

His Majesty has, therefore, been obliged to recall the greatest part of the army which he had in the territory of Hanover, and these troops being in the heart of Germany, could not do otherwise than pass through a part of the empire to get to the place of their destination.—But although the motives and the intention of their passage are most clearly pointed out by the present state of affairs, which is known to the whole world, and it is consequently impossible to misconstrue them; nevertheless, in order to preclude any observations which malignity might suggest to misinterpret them, his Majesty has charged the undersigned to give to the Germanic Diet those explanations which are contained in the present note.

(Signed) BACHER.

Letter from the Emperor Napoleon to the

Grand Pensionary of Holland; dated Strasburgh, Sept. 29, 1805.

MY VERY DEAR AND GREAT FRIEND! — I have been obliged to withdraw my army from Holland, to make head against an impious coalition which the gold and the intrigues of England have formed against me and my allies. I have commanded in my empire the formation of national guards for the defence of my frontiers. You will be aware that, in the present circumstances, the friends of their country must take up arms to repel those bands, eager for pillage, whom England would throw into their shores. However, let not the inhabitants of Holland be alarmed. My armies of reserve, of Boulogne and Mentz, are more than sufficient to succour the troops which defend their coasts, and to prevent any army who violate the Batavian territory from re-embarking. In the present circumstances, my very dear and great friend, I depend upon your zeal and patriotism. The cares of war do not so entirely absorb my attention, that I shall not constantly watch for the concerns of the Batavian country. An army might indeed land, but be assured that it would not re-embark. However, I call upon the courage and patriotism of the Batavians to confound the hatred of the tyrants of the sea, and to secure that part of the Continent from the invasion of the pirates.—Herewith I pray God to take you, my very dear and great friend, under his holy protection.

NAPOLEON.

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.
Second Letter of the Minister of the Interior to the Prefects, dated Paris, Sept. 25, 1805. Concluded from p. 576.

The Emperor calls for the conscription of the year 14; for an extraordinary war, confines himself to accelerating by a few months an ordinary measure. Let this appeal, made to the courage of the French youth, be heard by them, and repeated by all the public functionaries! Employ your activity and your influence to hasten its results. The more prompt its operation, the more happy will be its consequences. Join the means of persuasion to the employment of your authority. Call—press those whom the law calls: encourage the zeal of those who shew themselves ready to obey it: against the others enforce all its rigours. Tell those under your administration, that it is by this decisive measure they will obtain a prompt Peace, the first and last object of the Emperor's wishes: that this alone can save them the calamities and ex-

haustion of a prolonged War, and the sacrifices it renders necessary: that it is this which will remove the War from our frontiers, and will throw the weight of it on our enemies.—Speak of their interest, of their true interests, to those who may not be affected by the national glory; but these would not be Frenchmen. Honour, that sentiment essentially French, will speak with energy to every heart worthy of that name: the voice of the country, which calls them to her defence against an unjust provocation, will not be disregarded by them, and they will all hasten to partake of that long inheritance of glory earned on the Alps, in the Plains of Italy, on the borders of the Rhine and the Danube. He who has always commanded victory, whose genius is as powerful as his determination is firm and immoveable, whose thought embraces every combination of times, places, and men, who has saved you from evils from without and perils from within, and under whose shield you have placed your destinies—your Emperor—the man of the age and of the nation, leads himself your ranks!—What Frenchman is not jealous of sharing his danger and his glory? Who is the man that can hear without emotion that expression of the Emperor to the Senate, at the moment of his departure: “Frenchmen, your Emperor will do his duty; the Army will do theirs; you will do yours!”—Public functionaries, it is particularly to you that this is addressed. The first of your duties is the defence of your country: proprietors, cultivators, the tranquil possession of your fields must be ensured: merchants, manufacturers, artists, artizans, in your industry are your riches and your existence; know how to insure to yourselves its free exercise, and to open new outlets to its products. Fathers of families, you should keep at a distance from your peaceable dwellings the evils, and even the very noise of war; and if your sons did not march against the enemy, you would have to take arms for the defence of your fire-sides. Frenchmen, your glory and independence are in question. You, Sir, have to justify the choice by which the Emperor has honoured you; and it is by hastening the progress of the Conscription that you will acquire the highest claim up to his suffrage and his good-will!—Your zeal shall be judged by its results: let it be such that I shall have to felicitate you on having well-merited of the Prince and of the Country. Receive, Sir, the assurance of my perfect consideration.—(Signed)

CHAMPAGNY.

Circular Letter from the Minister of Finance to the Chiefs of Administration in his Department, dated Paris, Sept. 25, 1805.

War, Sir, has broke out on the Continent by the perfidy of our neighbours. The Emperor marches at the head of a formidable army, and the honour of the French Eagles shall be soon avenged. The zeal of all the citizens of the empire ought to second the devotion of its august Chief, and to prove that they are all animated with the same sentiment, the love of the country. It belongs to those whose functions place them the nearest to the government, to distinguish themselves on this important occasion, by their eagerness to concur in measures which may hasten the return of Peace, the sole object of the labours and the wishes of the Hero who presides over our destinies. Those whose children are called by their age to the honourable duty of defending their country, ought to press their junction with their competitors in this glorious career. Every one should redouble his zeal, whether for preventing the frauds which might diminish the revenues of the States, or for accelerating the entry of those revenues into the Public Treasury. I invite you, Sir, to write in this spirit to the different persons employed in the administration which you direct. I have the honour to salute you. (Signed)

GAUDIN.

Letter from M. Talleyrand to Count Cobentzel, on his sending him a Memorial in Answer to his Note of Sept. 3.

The Undersigned has the honour to send to his Excellency Count Cobentzel, the annexed Memorial, drawn up in consequence of the Note of the Cabinet of Vienna, which Count Cobentzel addressed to the Undersigned, on the 3d September.—Since that Memorial received the approbation of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, the Austrian army has passed the Inn, and invaded Bavaria. If the pacific sentiments with which his Majesty the Emperor of Germany and of Austria, says he is animated, be real, he must be aware, that no negotiation can be entered upon; that no proposition can be listened to, unless the Austrian troops recross the Inn, and return to their due limits. If the Court of Vienna refuses to withdraw them, it is the intention of his Majesty to compel him to it by force of arms. The calamities which must be the inevitable consequence of such a war, will wholly redound upon the House of Austria.

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and victory will declare against the oppressor, in favour of the weaker oppressed.—The Undersigned has received from his Majesty, the Emperor and King, express orders to declare, that in no case his Majesty will suffer Austria to aggrandize herself in Germany, or to make acquisitions in Bavaria, and accomplish the project she has often betrayed, to extend her frontiers to the Lech, and to drive the Elector of Bavaria to the left Bank of the Danube. Such a project is too decidedly hostile to the interests of the Germanic Body, to those of France, to the promises in which his Majesty the Emperor and King has bound himself, to the engagements into which he has entered to maintain the integrity of Bavaria.—After this positive declaration of a resolution which, in every circumstance that may arise, will be an invariable rule of conduct for France, it will be for the House of Austria to consider, whether it be her interest to incur all the hazards of war, merely because she wishes, but without any well-grounded hope of being able to accomplish her wish, to obtain a part of Bavaria? for fruitless would be her efforts to conceal what is now notorious to all Europe, that, such in reality, is her only object.—The Undersigned requests the assurances of his high consideration, &c.

(Signed) TALLYERAND PERIGORD.

Memorial referred to in the preceding Note; being the French Answer to the Second Declaration of the Court of Vienna to the French Court. See p. 533.

Without dwelling upon the allegations which pervade the Note of the Court of Vienna, (of the 3d of September), attention will only be paid to the notions of peace which that Note holds forth.—The Court of Vienna has made levies of men and preparations of all sorts: she now allows a foreign army to enter her territory.—Her only object to listen to her assurances is to oblige France and England to make peace; but if such be the object of the Court of Vienna, how has it happened that she forgets to make known the basis upon which that peace ought to be concluded? Is the basis to be the treaties of Luneville, or Amiens, or the *status praesens* of the two nations, as seemed to be the wish of Austria when the first overtures were made for the last peace? Or after all pretensions drawn from the same source as the allegations now directed against France? From an attentive perusal of the Note of the Court of Vienna, it would appear that Austria would assume

for basis of future negotiations the treaties of Luneville and of Amiens; but will England, who not long since refused to re-establish peace upon these principles, accede to them at present?—The Cabinet of Vienna has said nothing upon the subject, and should it happen that England would not adopt them, his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, who would not assume the character of mediator, unless he were really invested with it; a character which essentially consists in an *impassible* justice; a perfect impartiality, has no doubt, in concert with other powers, adopted measures for obliging England to acknowledge his principle of mediation, as he has taken to the same effect to compel France: doubtless he has fleets ready equipped, cruises set on foot; in fine, all possible means put in force which are indispensably necessary to the attainment of his object.—The Note of the Cabinet of Vienna affords no light upon any of these points. It is essential however to know.—1st, Whether the Court of Vienna is aware whether the treaties of Luneville and of Amiens are to be taken as the basis of the new negotiations, or whether those treaties are to be abolished? 2dly, In the latter supposition upon what basis does the Court of Vienna understand that the negotiations are to be set on foot? 3dly, Whether England has declared her readiness to adhere to the principles of his mediation? 4thly, In case of refusal on the part of England, what measures have been taken by the mediator, and what means has he at his disposal to compel her to adhere to it?—If the Court of Vienna has not put these questions to itself, and if it requires time to answer them, this alone should make it sensible, that it has acted with a precipitancy contrary not only to all the assurances it had given, but also to the end it declares to have in view; and it may further be attempted to observe contrary to what the enlightened policy of the House of Austria would advise it to adopt. Be it as it may, approaching circumstances will decide, whether it has been guided by a just conviction of its own interests, or led astray by blind prejudices.—The remonstrances and assurances to which the Court of Vienna here alludes, are mere illusions. She made no observation, she preferred no complaint; no, not more than the Court of France has made respecting the incorporation of Lindau, and all the other annexations that have been made by Austria in Suabia. The threats of armaments, and the pretended determination to uphold by force, what the Court of Vienna styles in-

novations, have a still less real existence.—The free and salutary organization of a country previously governed by law, arising out of accidental circumstances, most assuredly does not require to be supported by threats, or guaranteed by hostile armaments. And how can it be said with any shadow of probability, that the Emperor of the French was threatening Austria, at the very moment of the greatest activity of his preparations against England?

Marginal Annotations upon the Note of the Court of Vienna, of the 3d September, inserted in the French Official Paper, the Moniteur, of the 30th September, 1805.

Upon this vague indefinite exposition, which sets out with accusations and explanations, but which explains and proves nothing, there is only one observation to be made, and that observation will be peremptory and precise.—Switzerland, Holland, and Italy, have freely established the constitution which they wished for. In what respect does this legitimate use of the primitive right of all states infringe upon the particular rights of Austria? During the negotiations at Luneville, Austria required the evacuation by the French troops of the territory of the Italian, Helvetic, and Batavian republics, and France refused to comply. France required of Austria to guarantee the independence of these republics; and Austria, it is true, manifested the utmost repugnance to accede to this demand, but at length consented. These three states therefore ought, in the sense it was understood by Austria, to remain free; and nevertheless still continue to keep a French army on their territory. How can this independence have been altered by the spontaneous establishment of that fixed form of government which has put an end to former uncertainties; and of the federal system that has connected them in alliance with France?—If Austria will go back to the times antecedent to these new establishments, she will find that France was mistress of all Italy: she possessed every power, even the legislative authority; and the power that governed had been established by the French generals. In Switzerland, in Holland, the French armies constituted the only organized force that secured the public safety. Let Austria quote a single article of the treaty of Luneville that has prescribed the departure of the French troops; let her cite a single note of her's, or any one step formally taken by her since the conclusion of that treaty, which had for its object

to require that evacuation.—If Austria considers the present state of things, let her say in what respect constitutions adapted to times, to places, to the interests of countries, and already approved from an happy experience, furnish grounds on her part for regret at the past, or uneasiness respecting the future. What sort of interest is that which prompts one to deplore the happiness and the security of nations? What kind of benevolence is it that would advise states to imagine themselves oppressed, when they are in possession of laws and of a government, the work of their own will, the result of their common suffrages and choice? Of what nature in fine is that justice which proposes war to bring back disorder and confusion to those countries in which at present prevails order, tranquillity, and confidence?

—But the Court of Vienna again resorts to generalities: but from under the veil of such vague allegations, one may discern the views of a policy timidly jesuitical, that would dexterously slip over recollections, and prepare itself for disavowals. The Emperor of Austria has not hesitated to acknowledge the changes that have taken place in Switzerland, since he has a minister at Berne: nor those changes that have happened in Holland, since he has accredited a minister at the Hague: nor those that have arisen in Italy, since his Majesty's own letters, as well as those of his minister, M. de Cobenzel, attest them. But now that Court of Vienna would endeavour to get rid of all these previous measures. Is it to be supposed that the King of the Romans would not recognise the acts of the Emperor of Germany? Or does the present aspect of affairs appear to him more favourable, and from the consciousness of being supported, would he not disavow all past engagements? It was thus that Austria rejected the treaty of Campo Formio. Then, as at present, she attributed to the necessity of moderation, to delicate and critical circumstances, to an anxiety to remove greater dangers, stipulations formally entered into. But it may be necessary to say that the circumstances are not wholly alike. When Austria declared that the peace of Campo Formio was broken, she had gained a battle. Now she should at least have waited for a victory before she became so ostentatious of the strange principles that have guided her conduct. The reflections she here indulges in are literally taken from the English papers. Not one of them but furnishes a text for the daily declamations of those writers, who doubtless did not flatter themselves with being honoured by such

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plagiarism.—As to the imputation made against France of her endeavouring to exclude Russia from a participation in affairs of general interest, it appears somewhat extraordinary, after the well known steps taken by France to solicit the mediation of Russia in the outset of the present war with England. This imputation is particularly new on the part of Austria, who surely cannot forget that it was France, that, in despite of Austria, brought in the intervention of Russia in the arrangement of the Germanic empire. Was it not Austria who requested a thousand times, and in the most urgent manner, that Russia should take no part in the affairs of Germany? And it is Austria nevertheless that reproaches France with endeavouring to exclude Russia from every kind of interest in the maintenance of the general balance. Neither has France more pretended to such influence with respect to England. Does not the treaty of Amiens contain stipulations with respect to objects foreign to the two contracting powers, and solely relative to the general system?—Austria speaks of the “rights of victory after the peace that has put an end to them;” justly: and France likewise acknowledges this principle, while Austria not only attempts to revive, but to usurp the rights of victory after the conclusion of peace; and, indeed, what victory has given her a right to refuse paying the debt of Venice? Had Austria conquered Venice? What victory gave her right to annex to herself, in Suabia, a multitude of possessions, by fortifying which she weakens and alarms the neighbouring states? Had Austria been victorious in Suabia? What victory, in fine, has given her a right to torment Bavaria with pretensions, upheld by open force, and to ruin Switzerland by sequestrations? Had Austria conquered Bavaria or Switzerland? Most certainly victory should not be abused, but least of all would it be just or reasonable to take advantage of victories that have not been gained.—It is possible that attempts may have been successfully made to alarm the Emperor of Germany, and to persuade him that his security may one day be threatened by France; but he will feel, perhaps too late, that the power he has most to dread is not France, and that his dangers are much nearer and much greater on the part of that power whose aid he, for the second time, has had the imprudence to accept. It is Austria that requires to be taught if that power be formidable to its neighbours? If it has set limits to the aggrandizement which seems to be the object of its political sys-

tem? If it be easy to agree with it respecting the operations of war, or the combinations of peace? If the maintenance of its armies be not burthensome to those countries that admit them? If the distance of the places from whence they come does not prolong their stay, and make their return more difficult? In a word, if the devastations committed by its light troops do not leave behind them every where indelible vestiges of their passage? This is the language of reason; but the Court of Vienna has an ear only for the voice of passion, and of a thoughtless resentment against France.—It was hardly to be expected to have found among the complaints of the House of Austria, the reces of the empire, which was worth to her the Bishopric of Eichstadt, of Salzburg; territories which she has not ceased to extend, rights which she has continually endeavoured to exaggerate; and, in fine, of indemnities which she had no reason to expect from the treaty of Luneville. Besides, was not that reces the effect of the power which Austria now connects with her complaints and her cause? States of Germany, it is to you that these remonstrances are addressed. Should the House of Austria prove successful against France, the reces will be annulled. All the states of Germany must expect to see demands of indemnity made upon them for the indemnities they have received. Such is the respect in which Austria holds her engagements! Such is the protection she holds out to feeble states.—The next article contains its own refutation. The explanations given by France have been sanctioned by events. It is a question *de facto*, to ascertain if violence was or was not done to the will of the people in the countries that have improved their constitution. Allegations of constraint in this respect cannot well be admitted on the part of a jealous power. It was natural for France to have wished that those countries should be happy whom she had separated from a foreign domination; and she is well aware that the only means of ensuring the happiness of a country is to leave it the choice of its institutions and its laws. The preponderance of France over Italy and Switzerland is in the first instance the result of her victories; and in the next place it has been consecrated by the very treaty of Luneville, since it did not exclude the French troops, and that at a time when these countries had no constitution. At the time of the treaty they were in the possession of the French army; they did not exhibit a republican, or any form of government. The fairest use which France

could make of her preponderance, was, no doubt, to leave to the countries the time of settling their own constitutions. They have bestowed their attention upon that subject for three years, and their time has not been mis-spent; since the House of Austria, who had only an internal regulation to establish in her Italian provinces, did not succeed in establishing it. The states of Venice are not yet organized.—This allegation is no less false than the preceding ones. The steps taken by France towards a peace with England have been public. All the documents of this negotiation are confined to a single letter, and we may defy the Court of Vienna to find in this letter, that the Emperor of the French had laid it down as a clause of the pacification, that England should not interfere in the affairs of the Continent.—England has returned no answer to the overtures of France. First of all she wished to ascertain whether it might be possible to renew a coalition. The coalition is formed, and England is dispensed from answering. This restriction is a chimera, and the relations which then existed between the Courts of London and St. Petersburg were by no means so close as they have since been. England had no other motive than the hopes of discord, which she has had too much success in realising. It was when the instigations of England had acquired weight in Russia, that the pretended mediation between England and France was determined on; and it was because this mediation had not been founded on principles of moderation and impartiality, that it was revoked almost as soon as announced. What the Court of Vienna alleges here, respecting the political existence of other independent states, is a trite pretext. The organization of these states is a natural consequence of their position, their wants, and their dangers. This organization is as indifferent to England as to Austria, and can excite only the regret of England. It but ill becomes continental powers to desire that there should be no state on the Continent which might improve its marine, and protect itself against the maritime oppression of England.—For the maintenance of peace Austria has begun by the invasion of Bavaria. Thus it is that she has above declared, that the end of her measures was governed by pacific sentiments, and that she was not arming with any hostile view.—As to the Emperor Alexander, if he had been inclined to peace, he would have known that it was not by insulting great powers that they were to be conciliated. If he had wished to be a mediator, he would have remain-

ed impartial between France and England. We do not here canvass the personal dispositions of the Emperor Alexander; we do not in the least doubt that they are just, humane, and moderate; but the experience of all times has shewn that, on every occasion, when they wish, the diplomatic agents of Russia depart from the principles of their Sovereign, and pursue each their passions and their individual political bias. Besides, the Court of Vienna should leave to that of Russia the office of declaring what are its intentions and views.—Every power that appeals to general principles, on its interference in a quarrel between two other powers, ought, it should seem, to hold the same language, and to employ the same means with respect to both. As, then, Austria and Russia declare that they have armed in order to oblige France to listen to terms of accommodation, why do they not make known what they have done, in order to compel England to submit to their mediation? They send armies against France; why do they not also send squadrons against England? They say that the balance of power on the Continent is changed; are the rules of maritime law established by England satisfactory to them? Does it appear to them that the neutrality of the seas has been observed? Do they find that the English fleets respect their flags, and do their pretensions with regard to the blockade of ports appear to them legitimate rights? When the conduct of two belligerent states is under consideration, different standards of weights and measures should not be resorted to.—If the two Imperial Courts were really disposed to peace, if their intention was to place negotiation beyond the influence and dictation of England; instead of employing vague and indeterminate expressions, such as "on the most moderate terms, compatible with the general repose and security," they would have said, that their intention was to obtain, by an honourable and sincere mediation, the full execution of the treaties of Amiens and Luneville.—We are too far removed from those times when powers arrogated to themselves the right of interfering in the internal affairs of France, to set any value on the renunciation of this right. The sole mention of this ridiculous pretension, so long abandoned, is in itself an indecency.—If the sentiments of England be analogous to those of the Imperial Courts, we ought then to judge of the sentiments of the Court of Vienna by those of England; of its just and impartial policy by the uniform conduct of England; of its benevolence

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Son coalition has passe attacked You you vance by our front Rhine. without shall no Soldiers, you; yo great pe they will and disso formed land. — marches every kin may be o them, a have plan our enem By order of the gra

to the feeble, and of its justice to neutrality, by the moderation of England. If England entertained pacific sentiments, if she was just and moderate, there would be at present no war upon the Continent, because there would be no maritime war.—The doubts of the Emperor Napoleon are wholly removed; you wish for Bavaria; but it is necessary that you too should not remain in doubt respecting the intentions of the Emperor Napoleon: he will never suffer you to retain Bavaria. As to the general question, it is not more complicated. When Russia shall make a declaration of her intentions, we shall be able to judge of them, and there will be no difficulty in answering her; so far as England is concerned, it would be in vain for Austria to endeavour to represent her as just in her pretensions, or moderate in her views. We shall give credit to the justice of England when she shall have consented to come back to those engagements which she entered into by the treaty of Amiens, and which she has violated.

Proclamation of the Emperor Napoleon to the French Army, dated Strasburgh, Sept. 29, 1805.

SOLDIERS.—The war of the third coalition has begun. The Austrian army has passed the Inn, violated treaties, and has attacked and driven our ally from his capital. You yourselves have been compelled to advance by forced marches to the defence of our frontiers. Already you have passed the Rhine. We will not again make peace without a sufficient guarantee. Our policy shall no more give way to our generosity.—Soldiers, your Emperor is in the midst of you; you are only the advanced guard of a great people. If it should be necessary, they will all rise at my voice to confound and dissolve this new league which has been formed by the hatred and the gold of England.—But, soldiers, we shall have forced marches to make, fatigues, and privations of every kind to endure. Whatever obstacles may be opposed to us, we will overcome them, and we shall take no rest until we have planted our eagles on the territory of our enemies. (Signed) NAPOLEON. By order of his Majesty the Major-General of the grand army.—BERTHIER.

Proclamation transmitted by General Massena to the French Army of Italy; dated Sept. 10, 1805.

SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY OF ITALY.—

His Majesty the Emperor and King has nominated me your General in Chief. It is pleasing to me again to behold my former companions in arms, and to find them still actuated by the same sentiments, the same attachment to discipline, and devotion to their duty, for which I have ever known them distinguished. I shall uniformly address them in this language; and I love to believe they well know how to answer it, if political circumstances oblige his Majesty, the Emperor and King, to give the signal for war, notwithstanding the desire he has constantly manifested to maintain peace. Soldiers! you will remember that you are on a field of battle illustrious by his victories, and that every step we shall find traces of his magnanimity and genius. I replace at your head a general distinguished by his services. He is called to another destination, where, doubtless, your wishes will accompany him. Soldiers! on whatever theatre his Imperial Majesty places us, let us justify his choice, and let us entertain but one thought; our country and our Emperor.—The Marshal of the Empire, General-in-Chief, (Signed) MASSENA.

Address of the Archduke Charles on taking the Command of his Army, dated Padua, Sept. 21, 1805.

On my arrival, no business presses more upon me than to inform the army that I am again at its head, and have taken the command upon me. I hope, from the recollection of former occurrences, so glorious for his Majesty's arms, that if war should be inevitable, contrary to his Majesty's sincere desire, I shall still find in the army that ancient spirit of confidence and perseverance, that unshaken steadiness in danger, that obedient bravery, and (I cannot mention it without being sensibly affected) that attachment to my person, and confidence in me, by which the most memorable days of my life have been distinguished, and which have led to actions for the welfare of the monarchy that can never be forgotten. I doubt not but the army will remember, at every period of my life, the care and attachment with which I shared its fate, both in prosperity and adversity.—Above all things I recommend the commanders of large or small bodies, to instil into the troops the true military virtues; a strict discipline, patience, obedience, and confidence. The spirit of discontent, obstinacy, stubbornness, drinking, and gambling, as well as every species of vice which uproots men's mo-

rais, must be extirpated in the army; and I shall seriously hold the commanders responsible for the observance of this exhortation.

—That the business at head-quarters may be managed according to a settled plan, I have divided the whole administration into four parts, each of which is to have its separate functions.

BOULOGNE FLOTILLA. — *Letter from Rear Admiral Lacrosse to the French Minister of Marine; dated Boulogne, Oct. 1, 1805.*

I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that the day before yesterday, the line of his Majesty's flotilla, consisting of 27 gun-boats alone, under Captain Dordelin, had the whole day 23 vessels in front of them, two of which were of the line, four frigates, and the rest cutters. Yesterday the enemy had not diminished in number; but accustomed to see them in such force, I did not think it necessary to reinforce our line, convinced that it was sufficient to repel all attacks.—At midnight, the weather being very thick, and the sea calm, I heard a warm firing and some discharges of cannon in the line. I made immediate dispositions for several divisions of the flotilla to go out; but the firing having ceased, I suspended that movement. Proceeding along the line, Captain Dordelin informed me that the gun-boat No. 62, head of the line to the east, commanded by Ensign Alex, had been surrounded by a chain of fire ships conducted by several pinnaces.—That officer, without slipping or cutting his cable, which would successively have exposed the whole line to danger from the fire ships, kept his post firmly, and directing all his efforts to the chain which connected the fire ships, he attempted to break it and succeeded.—The chain being broken, the fire ships defiled along the line, yet the gun-boat No. 306, Captain Nivelain, was grappled by six of them. The officer performed the same manœuvre as Captain Alex, and his second in command, and two others, jumped into the boat and disengaged the vessel.—But one of the fire ships having exploded near the gun-boat, she was thrown up covered with water, and had no other damage than her windows broken and some shot on board. No. 291 also experienced the effects of the blowing up. The gun-boats No. 280, 305, 138, 34, and 61, were more particularly attacked, but did not quit their post. Some of the ropes merely were cut by the balls,

and the enemy's pinnaces, repulsed by a warm firing, soon took to flight, and were indebted for their safety to the darkness of the night. At two o'clock all was quiet along the line, and we had not a man killed. At day-break, Captain Alex having perceived some articles floating, sent his boat with six men for them: they brought back a spherical machine, copper sheathed, and which was found to be one of the infernal machines, call by the Moniteur, Globes of Compression. As it was being conveyed on shore, it blew up, and the Midshipman Messurier and three men perished.—At low water we found on the coast several wrecks of the fire ships; and particularly a lock like that of the fire machines which the English used last year with as much ridicule and as little success. (The letter concludes by praising the conduct of the soldiers and sailors of the flotilla.) (Signed)

LACROSSE.

DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPER.

Order read to the different Companies of the Coldstream Regiment of Guards, by order of His Royal Highness the Duke of York, dated October 3, 1805.

The Duke of York cannot allow the period of his removal from the command of the Coldstream Regiment to pass, without expressing in the strongest terms, the probation to which the regiment is, by its uniform good conduct during the twenty-one years the Duke has had the happiness of commanding it, so justly entitled. His Royal Highness desires, that the officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers of the regiment will, with this faithful testimony to their merit, accept his warmest thanks for the many most grateful marks of their regard and attachment, which he has experienced during the course of his command; and he desires to assure them, that individually they will ever retain his highest esteem; and that, as a corps, their honour and success will ever remain the objects of his most earnest solicitude. The Duke has done them justice in his representation to their present Colonel; and the regret with which His Royal Highness leaves the regiment is lessened, by resigning the command of it to a successor, who, His Royal Highness is persuaded, will feel an equal attachment to the regiment, and will on every occasion, most zealously promote its interest and happiness.